Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 43

Number 2

Article 9

Summer 2000

Strategic Voting on Multimember Courts
Evan H. Caminker
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
Evan H. Caminker, Strategic Voting on Multimember Courts, 43 Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad
Notes) - (2000).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol43/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

In appellate adjudication, decisions
are rendered by a multimember court
as a collective entity, not by individual
judges. Yet legal scholars have only
just begun to explore the formal
and informal processes by which
individual votes are transformed into
a collective judgment. In particular,
they have paid insufficient attention
to the ways in which the vote of each
individual judge is influenced by
the views of her colleagues on a
multimember court.

TheJallowing essay is adapted from "Sincere
and Strategic Votin Norms on Mu.ltim mber
Courts" and is r; p1inted with permission
fro m Michigan Law Review, August 1999,
Vol. 97, no. . Cop light 1999 by The
Michigan Law Review A sodation. The full
article, with citations is available from
Law Quadrangle Notes or the author.

In recent years, a growing number of
political scientists exploring judicial
behavior have modeled this aspect of
adjudication. Some theorists have
recognized , as Lee Epstein and Jack Knight
write in The Choices Justices Make (1998),
that judges "are strategic actors who realize
that their ability to achieve their goals
depends on a consideration of the
preferences of others, of the choices they
expect others to make, and of the
institutional context in which they act."
In certain contexts, a rational judge will
deviate from her personal sincere views
about the law in order to secure the most
desirable collective decision possible, given
the views held by the other relevant
panicipants Qudges or other governmental
actors) who share input into that final
collective decision.
This political science scholarship is
either empirical or predictive, identifying
when strategic behavior does or is likely to
occur. It tells us nothing about how judges
ought to operate. This normative question is
my focus here: Under what circumstances,
and for what ends, may a judge appropriately
engage in strategic behavior as a member of
a multimember court? Not infrequently, as
Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence ager have
noted ('The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Couns," 81
California Law Review 1 [1993]) , a judge
will discover that by supporting an
outcome or rationale with which she
disagrees, she can prevent her ourts
adoption of some other outcome or
rationale that she thinks worse either for
justice in the case before her or for the state
of the law in general. When such
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In appellate adjudication, decisions
are rendered by a multimember court
as a collective entity, not by individual
judges. Yet legal scholars have only
just begun to explore the formal
and informal processes by which
individual votes are transformed into
a collective judgment. In particular,
they have paid insufficient attention
to the ways in which the vote of each
individual judge is influenced by
the views of her colleagues on a
multimember court.

The following essay is adapted from "Sincere
and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember
Courts" and is reprinted with permission
from Michigan Law Review, August 1999,
Vol. 97, no. 8. Copyright 1999 by The
Michigan Law Review Association. The full
article, with citations, is available from
Law Quadrangle Notes or the author.

In recent years, a growing number of
political scientists exploring judicial
behavior have modeled this aspect of
adjudication. Some theorists have
recognized, as Lee Epstein and Jack Knight
write in The Choices Justices Make (1998),
that judges "are strategic actors who realize
that their ability to achieve their goals
depends on a consideration of the
preferences of others, of the choices they
expect others to make, and of the
institutional context in which they act."
In certain contexts, a rational judge will
deviate from her personal sincere views
about the law in order to secure the most
desirable collective decision possible, given
the views held by the other relevant
participants Qudges or other governmental
actors) who share input into that final
collective decision.
This political science scholarship is
either empirical or predictive, identifying
when strategic behavior does or is likely to
occur. It tells us nothing about how judges
ought to operate. This normative question is
my focus here: Under what circumstances,
and for what ends, may a judge appropriately
engage in strategic behavior as a member of
a multimember court? Not infrequently, as
Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager have
noted ("The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts," 81
California Law Review 1 [1993]), a judge
will discover that by supporting an
outcome or rationale with which she
disagrees, she can prevent her courts
adoption of some other outcome or
rationale that she thinks worse either for
justice in the case before her or for the state
of the law in general. When such

LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES SUMMER

2000 61

The more capacious or
multivariate a justice's
jurisprudential methodology,
the more facts will become
relevant to her comparison
and ranking of alternative
legal rules.
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opportunities arise, must a judge always
vote for rules that reflect her best personal
judgment as to how a legal issue ought to
be addressed without considering how her
input will affect the Court's collective
output? Or may the judge vote to secure
what she deems the best possible collective
resolution of the case, even if to do so she
must strategically suppress or misrepresent
her sincere personal views?
Throughout this article, I shall use the
term "sincere voting" to refer to the vote
that represents an individual judges topranked or ideal judgment as to what
constitutes the best response to resolve a
discrete legal controversy, without
considering the impact of his vote on the
substantive collective result in his court or
in other institutions. In other words, a
judge votes sincerely if he supports the
position that he honestly thinks should win
and that he would endorse were he alone
on the court. I shall use the term "strategic
voting" to refer to a judges decision to vote
for a position that does not truly reflect his
"sincere" judgment in order to secure the
best feasible outcome given the influence of
his colleagues in the decisionmaking
process. To make this inquiry more
manageable, I confine my focus to strategic
behavior in merit determinations by justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court.

Strategic decisionmaking
At the outset, let me identify this
projects central premise concerning judicial
motivation: Subject to resource constraints,
judges endeavor to discern and render their
best judgment as to the proper resolution of
cases according to their best conception of
the law. By this assumption I intend to
distinguish my analytical approach from
that employed by much recent literature
concerning judicial behavior, which posits
that judges employ instrumental rationality
to advance one or more personal agendas
(such as a desire to imbue the substantive
content of the law with their personal
policy preferences, to enhance their
professional reputation and personal
prestige, and to enhance leisure).

The strategic pursuit of legitimate
adjudicatory values falls into two categories:
strategic voting to improve the institutional
efficacy of the Courts collective product
through its quantitative form ("form-driven"
strategies); and strategic voting to improve
the substantive content of the Courts
collective product ("content-driven"
strategies). Before delving into the details,
however, let me introduce an analytic
approach that is relevant for assessing the
attractiveness of strategic voting across a
range of circumstances.

A. Assessing the magnitude of
perceived error (MPE) of the
Court's output.
On a multimember court, sincere voting
by a justice will often lead to a collective
outcome that she believes is wrong. She
might, through strategic voting, be able to
improve the collective outcome from a
position she considers wrong to one she
considers less wrong. To decide whether it
is worth seizing this opportunity, she must
first consider how important it is for her to
supplant the greater error with the lesser one.
To make this assessment, she must
determine not only her sincere order of
preference for various rules (Rl through
Rn); she must also establish the relative
degree of error in adopting each suboptimal
rule. This latter determination I shall call
the "magnitude of perceived error" (MPE).
The following factors, among others, may
be relevant to this calculation:
■ Error costs. What principles are at
stake in the choice between two rules?
What tangible benefits or burdens are being
allocated? A justice might care more about
articulating the best rule when it will
determine issues of personal liberty, say
guilt/innocence or imprisonment/execution,
than when the rule will determine issues of
financial consequence, say availability of
punitive damages, or amoral policy
concerns, say a procedural pleading
requirement.
■ Error size. What is the size of a rules
perceived error? If the legal issue involves
personal liberty, how much will be wrongly
granted or denied? If the legal issue involves
money, how much will be wrongly allocated?

■

Error rigidity. Can those governed by
the rule circumvent its erroneous
application? A justice might care more
about correctness with rules that impose
immutable requirements on private conduct
than with those that merely establish
default rules around which private parties
can maneuver.
■ Error duration. How much precedential
significance will the legal rule have? The
more frequently the same or substantially
equivalent issues will arise in the future, the
greater the temporal "ripple effect" created
by the Instant Case, and thus the more
important it is to be correct today
■ Error certitude. How confident is the
justice in her rankings based on the
aforementioned variables? The more certain
she is about Rl, the more she will perceive
any error as significant.
An MPE assessment of this sort, in one
form or another, determines a justice's
incentive to engage in form-driven and
content-driven strategic voting. Of course,
the particular factors (and weights thereo0
included in a justices MPE assessment are
derived from her jurisprudential paradigm,
and, more specially, the judgment criteria
that guide her legal interpretations. The
more capacious or multivariate a justices
jurisprudential methodology, the more facts
will become relevant to her comparison and
ranking of alternative legal rules.

B. Strategic voting to improve the
form of collective decisions.
The form of a multimember courts
product refers to the size of the justices
agreement (e.g., unanimous, majority,
plurality, or singular). Specific coalition
sizes can promote various institutional
values, and occasionally a justices desire to
shape a particular coalition will incline her
to endorse an outcome she views as
substantatively suboptimal. She might vote
insincerely with respect to substance to
forge a majority coalition supporting a
disposition of the case, she might do so to
forge a majority coalition supporting an
opinion articulating a specific legal rule,
and she might do so to forge a supermajority
coalition such as a unanimous opinion.
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1. Formation of majority-disposition

coalitions.
If the Instant Case presents three or
more plausible dispositions, sincere voting
might mean that no majority agrees on a
single preferred disposition (for example,
the justices might split among affirm,
reverse, and remand). Under the Courts
prevailing aggregation rules, such a division
prevents the Court from deciding the case.
The Court could avoid the potential
impasse through various voting protocols,
including: (a) adopt the disposition with
largest plurality support (if any); (b) hold a
"run-off' vote between the top two votegetting dispositions; or (c) compare
dispositions two at a time, and select the
option that defeats all other alternatives in
head-to-head competition if one emerges.
The Court has eschewed these
structured routes. Rather, individual justices
"play chicken" until one faction gives in and
shifts to its second-ranked rather than topranked disposition. In the final set of
opinions issued, each of the factions (which
might include from one to four justices)
articulates its sincere position. But one of
the minority factions then explains that, in
order to construct a majority-disposition
coalition necessary to decide the case, the
faction members will join another faction
by voting for what they consider to be the
second-best disposition.
A justices willingness to switch from his
sincere to second-best disposition should
depend on both institutional and
substantive variables. First, how much
value does he place on constructing a
majority-disposition coalition such that the
Court can issue a judgment in the Instant
Case? Second, based on the magnitude of
perceived error assessment, how strong is
his preference for his top-ranked
disposition (D1) over his second (D2), and
his second-ranked over the third (D3)?
It is difficult to determine just how
frequently sincere voting generates such
three-disposition impasses. The practice of
resolving them does suggest, however,
general acceptance of an adjudicative norm
that sincere views about case disposition
may be sacrified in order to facilitate the
Courts case-deciding function.
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2. Formation of majority-opinion
coalitions.
Perhaps much more frequently, a
majority of the Court will agree on a single
disposition but disagree as to the optimal
legal rule justifying that disposition. Sincere
voting will leave the majority disposition
supported by two or more divergent rules,
each championed by a minority faction of
one to four justices. Such fractured support
for the Courts disposition undermines
various institutional values.
First, a fractured decision undermines
the clarity of the legal rules that will govern
future disputes, thereby increasing the
unpredictability of the laws application to
primary conduct and increasing the costs of
future decisionmaking by subsequent
courts confronting the same legal issues.
Second, it undermines the durability of
legal rules, both by weakening the
precedential value of the Instant Case, and
perhaps also by diminishing public respect
for judicial decisions generally: Third, it
undermines the expressive function of
adjudication, by failing to articulate a
singular, coherent justification for the
judicial decisions.
In response to these institutional
concerns, one or more justices often
deviates from her substantively preferred
rule in order to accommodate her
colleagues sufficiently to form a majorityopinion coalition. Sometimes, the voteshifting factions opinion candidly reveals
the decision to vote strategically: More
frequently, the vote-shifting faction
suppresses its sincere views in the
published opinions, and the strategic
behavior can be detected, if at all, only
through careful research of what occurred
behind the scenes. For example, as Epstein
and Knight note in The Choices Justices
Make, Justice Powell voted insincerely in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982) in
order to forge a majority coalition; they
quote Powell: "[l]t is evident that a Court
opinion is not assured if each of us remains
with our first preference votes . . . . As I
view the Nixon cases as uniquely requiring
a Court opinion, I am now prepared to

defer to the wishes of you [Chief Justice
Burger], Bill Rehnquist, and Sandra"
[Sandra Day O'Connor] in order to forge a
single opinion of the Court.
It is frequently assumed that, in making
these calculations, the majority will
converge in a moderate or median position.
This may well be quite likely when the
justices' ideal points can be lined up nicely
in a single-peaked fashion along a single
dimension, for instance , from liberal to
conservative. Convergence on a center
position along the spectrum is not
guaranteed, however, depending on the
effects of small-group dynamics.
And sometimes the options under
discussion cannot easily be aligned along a
single dimension. Thus convergence in
form does not theoretically imply
movement toward a schematically median
or substantively moderate position.

3. Formation of supermajority coalitions.
More infrequently, justices coordinate
their voting to produce a unanimous
opinion. Unanimity establishes a very
durable judicial precedent, and it may elicit
greater respect from nonjudicial actors,
both ensuring short-term compliance with
the Instant Case disposition and ensuring
long-term respect for the decisions
underlying principles. More specifically,
coordinated unanimity appears to be
strategically deployed to counter perceptible
threats to the Courts legal (and sometimes
moral) authority:
Even where unanimity is not attainable,
justices might also feel some impulse to add
another voice to an existing majority
coalition. Such "extra" joinders may add to
a precedents durability, which a justice
might value even at the cost of a sincere vote.
For each of the types of coalitions
described in this section, a justice would
weigh the institutional values to be gained
against the costs of insincerity in the
particular case, which may include
institutional costs as well. Form-driven
strategic voting appears to be a generally
accepted practice on the Court. It is difficult
for outsiders to identify each occurrence,
however; justices understandably do not
candidly announce their decisions to form

insincere coalitions when doing so would
undermine their strategic purpose of
projecting solidarity:

C. Strategic voting to improve the
content oflegal rules.
Due to conventional voting protocols,
appellate courts offer individual judges
fewer opportunities to engage in contentdriven strategic voting than are available to
members of many other collegial bodies.
For example, legislatures often decide issues
through a series of votes comparing two
options at a time, sometimes called a
motion-and-amendment process, such that
savvy, sophisticated voting on early choices
frequently can manipulate the ultimate path
of alternative pairings and hence the
substantive outcome. On the Supreme
Court, each justice typically registers a
single vote to dispose of the entire case,
rather than a vote resolving each issue
raised by the case. Thus multiple-issue
cases do not generally present a justice with
an opportunity to misrepresent her views
on one or more issues just to dictate the
preferred resolution of the case as a whole.
This said, a justice may still have the
opportunity to guide the Court's collective
output toward her sincere view through
various forms of strategic voting behavior. I
will focus primarily on two such scenarios,
one unilateral and one bilateral.
1. Unilateral strategic voting to influence
a discrete legal rule.
Sometimes a justice, by supporting a
legal rule with which she disagrees, can
unilaterally prevent a collective outcome
that she considers even worse. Such a
unilateral strategy might be attractive in
either of two circumstances, both of which
can helpfully be illustrated by focusing on
Justice Brennans behavior in Craig v. Boren
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Under an intentionally simplified version
of the case, the relevant legal issue was
whether discrimination on the basis of sex
should be subject to strict scrutiny (SS),
intermediate scrutiny (IS), or rational basis
scrutiny (RBS). Suppose the justices' firstrank judgments divided them into three
equal-sized factions as follows: Justice

Brennans faction preferred SS; Justice
Powells faction preferred IS; and Justice
Rehnquists faction preferred RBS . Justice
Brennans first-rank judgment can be
gleaned from the fact that he recently had
advocated SS in Frontiero v. Richardson 411
U.S. 677 (1973), though he had failed to
convince a majority: But in Craig, Brennan
circulated a draft opinion for the Court that
advocated intermediate scrutiny; a view that
ultimately won the day:
Brennan apparently concluded that it
was preferable to vote strategically to
establish a durable precedent now for IS,
rather than to vote sincerely for SS. There
are two different scenarios under which
such a strategic maneuver makes sense. The
first ("Craig I") involves an effort to
influence the precedential significance of
the decision, assuming that all other justices
remain steadfast; and the second ("Craig II")
involves an effort to influence the collective
outcome by encouraging another justice to
change her vote.
First, Brennan might have assumed that
the Court would remain fractured across
the three tests as described above, and that
Powell and his faction would join the
Brennan faction in invalidating the sexbased classification. If so, Powells IS test
would have established a precedent of sorts
under the narrowest-grounds rule. But
Brennan might plausibly have feared that an
increasingly conservative Court would
embrace RBS in a future case, brushing the
weak Craig precedent for IS aside. Brennan
could then try to pretermit this most
disfavored possibility by strengthening the
Craig precedent, through joining Powells
position to forge a majority-opinion
coalition invalidating the statute under
intermediate scrutiny: This Craig I scenario
illustrates Brennans ability to forestall a
highly disfavored outcome (a majoritybacked precedent for RBS in a future case)
by influencing the precedential significance
of the Instant Case.
The Craig II scenario involves an effort
by a strategic-minded justice to induce a
colleague to change her articulated position,
thus changing the collective outcome in a
favorable direction. Such an opportunity
may arise whenever the colleagues

preference is multidimensional, meaning
there are two or more variables that drive
her ranking of rules. In such circumstances
a justice sometimes can, by strategically
repositioning himself, create or destroy
multidimensional options and thus
influence the colleagues selection from
among the available options.
For example, suppose Justice Powell and
his faction are concerned with both the
substance and form of the collective
decision in Craig. Powell favors IS, but he
also favors construction of a majorityopinion coalition to secure the concomitant
institutional benefits. Supose further that
Powells form-driven preference dominates,
such that he prefers to forge a majority
opinion even at the cost of abandoning IS.
If Powell prefers RBS to SS, then he would
be inclined to join the Rehnquist faction at
RBS to secure the institutional values of a
majority-opinion coalition. Brennan could
rationally try to forestall this most
disfavored possibility by embracing IS
rather than SS. This strategic maneuver
would induce Powell to stay with IS rather
than shift to RBS, by enabling Powell to
secure both his preferred substance (IS) and
form Qoining Brennan in a majorityopinion coaliton). This Craig II scenario
illustrates Brennans ability to avert a highly
disfavored outcome (a majority-backed
precedent for RBS in the Instant Case) by
influencing a colleagues vote in this case.
In both scenarios illustrated through
Craig I and II, Justice Brennan could
rationally conclude that the project of best
implementing the law according to his
intrinsic and relational judgment criteria
dictated a strategic choice to eschew his
sincere position SS and enshrine his
second-ranked rule IS now, thereby averting
the present or future possibility of his thirdranked RBS. This archetypal scenario of
unilateral strategic behavior can be modeled
as follows, applying the "magnitude of
perceived error" (MPE) concept developed
earlier. According to Justice Brennans
intrinsic and relational judgment criteria,
his ranking of the three rules proposed in
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Craig is as follows: Rl = SS, R2 = IS, and
R3 =RBS.When deciding whether to vote
strategically, Brennan should consider both
the likelihood of the Court ultimately
settling on each option and the MPE
represented by the two suboptimal rules,
R2 and R3. With respect to the former
variable, the more confident Brennan is that
unless he forges a majority opinion
coalition for IS in the Instant Case a
majority will embrace RBS in a near future
case (Craig I) or even the Instant Case
(Craig II), the more willing he should be to
vote strategically With respect to the latter
variable, the more he views R2 as a minor
error and R3 as.a major one, the more
willing he should be to vote strategically
and create a minor error in order to prevent
a serious one.
Unilateral strategic maneuvering of these
types is likely a common occurrence, even
though it typically cannot be detected by
others. Justices quite frequently change
their views over the course of a decision. Of
course, this sometimes reflects a change in
sincere views. Sometimes this behavior is
driven by the institutional benefits of a
majority opinion coalition, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that this is not the
primary motivation. Most of the time, I
think justices care about forging a majority
coalition only if it settles on a rule they
support - at least support enough. If
asked whether they would prefer a
majority-opinion coalition to coalesce even
if they would be left in dissent or
concurrence, I'd bet most often they would
say no. If my surmise is correct, then much
of the documented position jockeying and
concession granting on the Supreme Court
reflects strategic behavior designed to
improve the content of legal rules.

2. Bilateral vote trading.
Justices will sometimes confront an
opportunity to trade votes with one
another; each of two justices votes for the
other's sincere view on one issue in
exchange for the other's support of his
sincere view on another. Such an agreement
can be either explicit or tacit.
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a. Explicit vote trades. Consider the
following "vote-trading exemplar"
illustrating explicit vote trading across two
separate cases. Suppose the Courts docket
contains two separate cases, Case Search
raising the question whether a particular
search violates the Fourth Amendment, and
Case Cruel raising the question whether a
particular mode of execution violates the
Eighth Amendment. The tentative
conference vote in Case Search is 5-4 for
the criminal defendant, with Justice Wapner
in the majority and Justice Judy in the
dissent. The tentative conference vote in
Case Cruel is 5-4 for the state, with Justice
Judy in the majority and Justice Wapner in
the dissent. Suppose Wapner is close to
indifferent about his apparent victory in
Case Search, but is very troubled by his
apparent loss in Case Cruel; conversely,
suppose Judy is close to indifferent about
her apparent victory in case Cruel, but is
very troubled by her apparent loss in Case
Search. Wapner and Judy then agree to
trade votes across the two cases; Wapner
switches to vote for the state in Case Search,
and Judy switches to vote for the criminal
defendant in Case Cruel. From the
perspective of each justice, the trade has
improved the overall state of the law; each
views the trade as creating what he or she
considers a minor error but corrects what
he or she considers a more major error.
Justice Wapner is willing to sacrifice his
feasible victory in Case Cruel (the
"sacrificed case") for a more meaningful
victory in Case Search (the "acquired case");
for Justice Judy, the "sacrificed" and
"acquired" cases are reversed.
It is very difficult to identify clear
examples of explicit vote trading. My own
sense, in accord with that of other scholars,
is that explicit vote trading rarely - and
perhaps never - takes place.
b. Tacit vote trades. On the other hand,
my sense (again in accord with others) is
that a form of implicit and informal vote
trading is common. Sometimes, a justice lets use the fictional Judge Wapner quickly joins a draft opinion circulated by a
colleague even through the doctrinal rule
articulated does not reflect his sincere

position. Wapner nevertheless joins quickly
and without criticism, •indeed perhaps with
praise - because (a) he thinks the error is
relatively minor, and (b) he wants to
encourage the author to sign onto an
opinion in a completely separate but more
significant case that Wapner has recently
circulated or will circulate soon.
Of course, such tacit back-scratching
"agreements" are not formally enforceable.
The social norms of cooperation and
congeniality prevailing on the Court,
however, might strongly encourage a
practice of presumptive reciprocity Thus,
while explicit vote trading seems to be
shunned in word and deed, a softer form of
tacit trading may well be commonplace.

Normative constraints
on strategic voting
Form-driven strategic voting appears
relatively uncontroversial; content-driven
strategic voting engenders much greater
controversy. Explicit vote trading is
frequently denounced, though generally
without clear explanation. The more
common but subtle forms of tacit vote
trading and Craig-like unilateral
maneuvering either are ignored or provoke
lukewarm concerns. My strong sense is that
there is considerable disagreement about
the proper line between acceptable and
unacceptable strategic behavior and the
reason for drawing it.

Litigant-focused constraints
A. Sacrosanct disposition objections.
The primary function of even appellate
adjudication is commonly said to be
resolving a concrete legal dispute between
two or more litigants, with the articulation
of legal principles being incidental to that
task. Even assuming as I do here that
justices identify governing legal rules first
and derive dispositions from them, one
might believe that once the proper
resolution of the dispute is identified, the

putatively victorious litigant becomes
"entitled" to that resolution.
This view underlies what I call the
sacrosanct disposition constraint on
strategic behavior: a justice may vote
strategically for a suboptimal rule only if
her insincere vote leads to the same
disposition as her sincere vote would have
done. Legal rules are fair fodder for strategic
play, but sincerely derived case dispositions
are sacrosant.
Depending on whether one believes this
sacrosanct disposition principle should be
unyielding or merely presumptive, a sincere
disposition might impose either a "hard" or
a "soft" constraint on rule-focused
strategizing.
Many people, were they a litigant in
Case Search or Cruel, would be quite
disturbed if they would have won had a
justice voted sincerely, but lost because the
justice voted strategically to improve the
collective legal rule.
The strength of this underlying intuition,
however, can be questioned on its own
terms. To begin with, the intuition
confronts an interesting temporal question.
By hypothesis, strategically improving the
legal rule today affects not only who wins
the Instant Case but also who will win
future cases, changing future winners
(under the sincere rule) to future losers and
vice versa. Why should the entitlement of
today's would-be winner under sincere
voting trump the entitlement of the futures
would-be winner under the strategically
secured improved rule?
Moreover, the intuition seemingly
presumes that litigants care more about
winning than about establishing favorable
legal rules. This is not always so. Some
litigants expect to be repeat players in
similar future cases, and they may be
willing to sacrifice a particular victory for a
more favorable legal rule over the long run.
Some litigants who do not expect repeat
play may nevertheless care more about
establishing favorable legal principles than
about winning the discrete dispute, either
because they are representing others in class
litigation or because they care about the
expressive content of the law.

The intuition seemingly
presumes that litigants care
more about winning than
about establishing favorable
legal rules. This is not always
so. Some litigants expect to be
repeat players in similar future
cases, and they may be willing
to sacrifice a particular victory
for a more favorable legal rule
over the long run.
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If persuasive on its own terms, the
disposition constraint would preclude some
other common adjudicatory practices
besides vote trading. First, the constraint
contravenes some well-accepted norms
governing solo decisionmaking that lead
justices to support locally suboptimal
decisions. Even if Justice Solos intrinsic
judgment criteria incline her to prefer rule
Rl leading to disposition D 1, she might
strategically endorse R2 and D2 either to
embrace stare decisis and maintain
consistency with, or, alternatively, to
compensate for, a prior case that she views
as wrongly decided. Or, she might decide
the Instant Case suboptimally to establish
the best long-term precedent for a series of
cases. Taken seriously, the disposition
constraint would appear to rule out each of
these well-accepted adjudicatory practices.
Second, the disposition constraint also
rests in tension with some more
controversial norms governing solo
decisionmaking. As earlier discussed,
Alexander Bickels "passive virtues"
sometimes lead justices to deny favorable
judgments to would-be winners; concerns
about public resistance sometimes lead
justices to deny immediate remediation to
victorious litigants; concerns about
congressional overruling might lead justices
to shy away from sincere rules in a manner
depriving a would-be winner of a favorable
judgment.
Third, the disposition constraint would
appear to rule out form-driven maneuvers
in certain contexts. When a justice
strategically forms a majority-disposition
coalition to avoid a three-disposition
impasse, by definition she votes for a
disposition other than her sincere choice.
With respect to strategic voting designed to
forge a majority-opinion coalition,
sometimes one or more justices might
diverge from their sincere disposition in
order to do so. The disposition constraint
would rule out such form-driven
maneuvers.
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B. The litigant participation objection.
This objection starts with the premise
that adjudication is primarily party-driven,
in the sense that the judicial decision is
designed to respond to the factual proofs
and reasoned arguments advanced by
adversarial parties. Concomitantly, the
integrity of adjudication also entails a
reasoned decisionmaker, one who will
respond to and fairly evaluate the reasoned
arguments of the parties.
Explicit or tacit vote trading partially
undermines the meaningfulness of party
participation in the Instant Case by
introducing an influential element - the
Other Case - that cannot readily be
identified in advance. Parties cannot fairly
be expected to anticipate, let alone brief, the
entire set of other cases that might end up
influencing the decision in the Instant Case
through a vote trade; that set consists of
every other case on the Courts docket.
As a result, decisions influenced by vote
trading are arbitrary from the litigants'
perspective in the sense that they cannot
participate meaningfully, through reasoned
argument, in the critical judicial
determination - the trading justices'
comparative evaluation of error magnitudes.
Whether this objection is powerful
enough to explain the consensus antipathy
toward vote trading, however, turns on the
significance one attaches to meaningful
party participation through the presentation
of reasoned arguments. The more central
one views this role on either instrumental
or intrinsic grounds, the more troubling
vote trading becomes. But the more one
believes that party-driven adjudication,
while perhaps a good idea, is not
normatively essential, then the less
troubling vote trading becomes. At the far
extreme, if one views parties as helpful but
non-crucial judicial assistants, then the
justices' resort to decisionmaking means
beyond the parties' ken is not that
disturbing at all. Recall that even vote
trading does not devalue or ignore litigant
participation entirely; it just values some
non-participatory aspects of reasoning
as well.

Reasoned justification
constraints
This section explores a series of related
objections as applied, at least initially, to
bilateral trading. Each objection reflects a
theme common to many jurisprudential
paradigms: when justices declare what the
law is en route to deciding cases, we expect
them to base that declaration on reasoned
argument of a certain form.

A. Adjudication as a justificatory
practice.
Many respectable jurisprudential
paradigms hold that adjudication is, first
and foremost, a justificatory practice.
According to this view, the legitimacy of
courts' authority turns on the fact that
adjudication is a form of justification or
reason giving, in a way that other forms of
decisionmaking are not. If a judge does not
have a reasoned justification for a legal
decision, she has no legitimate claim to the
exercise of coercive authority over the
litigants. As a result, we are rightly hostile
to any adjudicatory practice that
undermines the process and integrity of
justification, even if that practice in some
sense "improves" the doctrinal rules
ultimately produced. Process, not result,
is paramount.
With this process focus in mind, one
might challenge explicit and tacit vote
trading as depriving the two traded
decisions of the type of reasoned
justification necessary to judicial legitimacy
After all, there seems to be an element of
arbitrariness to the decisionmaking in both
involved cases. In the vote-trading
exemplar, for example, Justices Wapner and
Judy do not take each of Cases Search and
Cruel into account when deciding the other
one because the result in one case
influences their sincere ranking of the
available rules in the other. Rather, they
take the other case into account only
because of the happenstance that, given the
particular lineup of all nine justices in both
cases, there is an available trade that both
believe improves the set of results. If Justice
Wapner were asked why he voted the way

he did in Case Search, he could not provide
a complete answer without mentioning the
role played by Case Cruel. While this
reference would partially "explain" his
decision, on the surface it would hardly
seem to "justify" it, at least in any sense
familiar to the judicial enterprise.
But reliance on familiarity here is
dangerous, precisely because multimember
decisonmaking may enable novel but still
legitimate notions of justification. Viewed in
isolation, Wapner'.s decision in Case Search
seems unprincipled; he has seemingly
"sacrificed" this case for law improvement
elsewhere. But why view Case Search in
isolation? The mere possibility of bilateral
vote trading essentially allows a justice to
vote on two issues at once as a packaged
deal, an option generally unavailable to
judges sitting alone. Consider Justice
Wapner'.s approach to the vote-trading
exemplar. Wapner sincerely supports Rule
S+ over Rule S- in Case Search and Rule C+
over Rule C- in Case Cruel, but if everyone
votes sincerely the Court will endorse Rule
S- in Case Search and Rule C- in Case
Cruel. Wapner can trade across the two
cases with Justice Judy, meaning he can
control whether the Court produces rules
S+ and C- (by voting sincerely) or rules Sand C+ (by trading). Put differently, Wapner
can change the relevant "choice set" from a
choice among single rules to a choice
among rule combinations.
As illustrated earlier, Wapner can
employ the "magnitude of perceived error"
rubric to reason from his jurisprudential
premises to the conclusion that he prefers
package S- and C+ to package S+ and C-.
His MPE assessment leads him to view
collective outcome S- as a lesser error than
collective outcome C-; he is therefore
willing to endure the former to forestall the
latter. He is not merely appraising the two
combinations to see which he prefers in
some troubling result-oriented sense.
Rather, he is employing the very same
process of reasoning that led him to prefer
S+ over S- and C+ over C- in the first
instance.

To be sure, the comparison of rule
packages rather than individual rules is
unfamilar. But why would this reasoning
process, deemed legitimate when used to
favor one rule over another, suddenly
become illegitimate when used to prefer
one rule package over another? It cannot be
problematic just because Wapner finds
neither package ideal. This complaint
would have too far-reaching consequences,
as judges frequently must choose between
two or more imperfect options when the
optimal option is not feasible to secure. And
it cannot be problematic just because there
is a sense in which, in evaluating the MPEs
associated with S- and C-, Wapner might be
comparing "apples and oranges" if the two
issues draw upon very different underlying
principles. First, it is unclear whether such
an apples-and-oranges comparison should
be troubling from a theoretical standpoint.
But in any event, this complaint would also
have too far-reaching consequences, as
judges frequently must compare
fundamentally different principles in
ranking alternatives.
Let us return to the initial claim here,
that concern for cabining illegitimate
assertions of coercive judicial authority
dictates hostility toward any adjudicatory
practice that undermines the process and
integrity of justification, even if that practice
in some sense "improves" the doctrinal rule
ultimately produced. It is true that vote
trading is generally described in terms of
improved results, not proper process. But a
justice can provide the same type of
justificatory explanation for a trade as for a
single-issue ranking: the outcome chosen
best satisfied his intrinsic and relational
criteria taking relevant MPEs into account.
The only difference is that the justice in a
vote-trading scenario ranks combinations of
rules rather than single rules. This
distinction does not appear to make the
ranking process any less an exercise in
reasoned justification.

One might nonetheless argue that the
different ways of conceiving the choice set
matters with respect to adjudicatory norms
relating to explanation rather than
justification. The next two sections consider
other norms arguably undermined by vote
trading: candor and noncommodificaton of
judgments.

B. The candor objection.
Explicit and tacit vote trading would
appear to lead a justice to endorse openly a
justification different from her true
motivation - the MPE calculation. Thus
decisionmaking through vote trading
violates an oft-proclaimed norm of judicial
candor.
This presumption of candor is frequently
justified on the ground that it disciplines
judicial reasoning. The act of reducing ones
true thought processes to written form
stimulates critical self-scrutiny, and the act
of publication enables peers and the public
to evaluate and hold individual justices
accountable for their decisions. Vote trading
partly avoids these disciplining and
constraining effects of transparency, because
the driving force behind a justice's decision
to trade - his comparative MPE assessment
of the two rules involved - is not revealed,
let alone publicly explained and justified.
These justifications for candor carry
some analytical and rhetorical force, though
their tangible effects are highly speculative.
This said, deciding just how much force to
give to such an objection is difficult. If
embraced as a rigid constraint, the
obligation of transparency would call into
question a number of adjudicatory practices
besides vote trading. Some sophisticated
behaviors, including many of Alexander
Bickel'.s "passive virtues," involve judicial
dissembling. Moreover, many
uncontroversial form-driven strategic
maneuvers designed to forge coalitions of
various sizes entail the suppression of
sincere views - indeed, that is the whole
point of forming unanimous-opinion
coalitions. Finally, content-driven strategic
maneuvers such as the unilateral Craig
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exemplar, while generally thought less
controversial than bilateral maneuvers,
entail the same misleading acts.
In the end, it is difficult to decide how
much weight to give the candor objection
to vote trading. In general, the candor
constraint is more persuasive when viewed
as a presumption than as an absolute. The
question with vote trading, as with all of the
other forms of judicial reasoning that
involve dissembling to some degree or
another, is whether the benefits in terms of
furthering judicial goals is worth the cost.
On this point, reasonable minds might
reasonably disagree, and perhaps for many
the answer will not tum on the particular
type of strategic maneuver but rather the
particular issue raised by or the context
surrounding the Instant Case.

C. The commodification objection.

The question is not whether judges
act in strategic or sophisticated
ways, meaning whether they
consider the consequences of their
choices in light of the potential
behavior of others. The question,
rather, is what institutional
commitments and conceptions
shape and constrain judges'
preferences and goals as they
interact with colleagues to
construct decisions of the Court.
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This objection posits that adjudicatory
processes have expressive as well as
functional significance, and argues that
bilateral vote trading as a means of rule
development undermines the ideal of
adjudication as principled reasoning.
Vote trading can be described in crass
transactional terms. A justice essentially
uses the MPE assessment to ascribe a value
to a given legal error, and then decides
whether it is worth trading for an unrelated
legal correction. Legal rules or judicial votes
can be characterized as goods or services to
be bartered within a judicial marketplace.
Such commodification of rules or their
production might alter or deform our
shared cultural understanding of
adjudication and its role in securing the
rule of law, by superimposing on
adjudication a preexisting set of cultural
norms associated with market activity. Or
so many might intuitively fear. Markets and
adjudication, the intuition runs, do not mix.
In the abstract, these are serious claims.
To my mind, however, the practice of vote
trading as I've described it would not
seriously threaten such profound alterations
of social meaning. We are not talking here
about a "literal" market, in which justices
exchange a commodity for tangible
currency.

In the vote-trading exemplar, justices
trade votes based on their reasoned (though
divergent) assessments of the rightness of
two reasoned (though divergent)
assessments of the rightness of two
collective outputs. The "currency" of
exchange is legal principle, not the traders'
own or the litigants' preferences or desires.
There is a sense in which two independent
products, the rule in the sacrificed case and
the rule in the acquired case, are appraised
for their relative value. But justices appraise
and compare the relative value of
competing rules or justificatory positions all
the time, without engendering a sense of
problematic commodification.
Concededly, social meaning
reformulation is not an on-off switch, and
commodification can range on a continuum
from complete to less-complete forms that
"bear some indicia of commodification but
are more attenuated," as Margaret Radin
wrote in Contested Commodities (1996).
Thus, even if one agrees that the votetrading exemplar is a far cry from a
prototypical market exchange, she might
still be somewhat troubled by indicia of
commodification still remaining. I think
that analytical argument cannot wholly
resolve the dispute.

Judicial lawmaking
constraints
The final set of objections revolves
around a common intuition: vote trading
crosses a conceptual or even constitutional
line dividing adjudication and legislation.
At one time this intuition might have been
captured by the claim that courts "declare"
rather than "make" law, and that focus on
law-making is an ultra vires judicial
function. A more sophisticated and modem
version would propose that, in a
meaningful sense, courts do make law, but
do so in a peculiarly judicial manner.
Something about vote trading makes it
seem as though justices are making law in
an inappropriate manner, and therefore, the
practice transgresses the proper boundaries
of adjudication.

We generally associate vote trading with
legislative activity Some people find judicial
vote trading intuitively illegitimate, I
believe, because they mentally associate the
practice with the more familiar
phenomenon of legislative logrolling. Based
on this connection, they wrongly assume
that the rationale for judicial vote trading
would mimic that for legislative vote
trading, and they (rightly) find the
preference-satisfaction rationale underlying
legislative logrolling anathema to judicial
reasoning. The first assumption is wrong
because judicial vote trading can be
supported by reference exclusively to legal
concepts and principles, and without
necessary resort to problematic objects such
as preference satisfaction.
Some might object that vote trading feels
legislative in nature because it seems to
focus on forward-looking law improvement
rather than backward-looking law
interpretation. "Law improvement" sounds
like a legislative task.
This way of characterizing the judicial
lawmaking constraint is rhetorically
powerful. However, it ignores the significant
extent to which well-accepted interpretive
practices already contain a forward-looking,
improvement-oriented element. As
explained earlier, relational judgment
criteria require justices to look forward as
well as backward, to select a rule that is
optimal over a run of related cases even if it
might be suboptimal for the Instant Case
viewed in isolation. The consistency
criterion, for example, requires justices to
envision the future cases in which today's
rule might apply and to fashion a rule today
that traces the optimal trajectory
A third objection adds the following
premise: due to institutional distinctions
between courts and legislatures, the goal of
competency in lawmaking requires courts
to employ a different lawmaking
methodology than do legislatures.
Legislatures are comparatively well designed
to consider and study societal problems
comprehensively, and to devise optimal
forward-looking solutions thereto. In
contrast, courts are not structured to be as
proficient at seeing far into the future, or at
perceiving and comprehensively

considering all of the ramifications and
interests affected by proposed doctrinal
rules.
Given these observations, the argument
continues, we have much more confidence
in justices' ability to develop optimal
forward-looking rules when the justices
focus their attention on fashioning a direct
response to the facts and context of the
dispute before them, rather than when they
engage in a self-conscious project of
abstract law improvement.
While the premise of this objection that courts should remain focused on
contextualized decisionmaking - is both
analytically and rhetorically powerful, the
deduction that vote trading violates this
norm demands greater scrutiny First, each
of the two cases involved in a vote trade
satisfy the normal requirements for
concreteness and adverseness. The trading
justices (and the rest), therefore, start from
a fact-bound, contextual setting and can
reason outward when they construct their
initial rankings of, and assess their
magnitudes of perceived error for, the
proposed rules in each case.
One might characterize the next
reasoning step in the vote-trading process
- the comparison of MPEs in the two
cases - to be somewhat abstracted from
the case contexts. When Justice Wapner
considers whether the perceived sacrifice in
Case Search is more than compensated by
the perceived improvement in Case Cruel,
he might ponder some seemingly abstract
questions like the following: Is it more
important for wrongful death sentences to
be avoided than for wrongful privacy
invasions to be allowed? This question
(and others like it) is not tethered to a
specific case. And yet, Justice Wapner
would certainly be aware of how his answer
to this question would ultimately affect his
vote and therefore the disposition of these
two concrete cases with identifiable parties.
In other words, the case-specific
consequences of his abstract reasoning
would be readily perceptible, at both
intellectual and visceral levels. This remains
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a far cry from the sort of abstract legislative
rulemaking against which the judicial
practice is being measured.
Perhaps a slightly different concern
animates the comparative competence
objection. One might argue that the
acceptance of vote trading as a legitimate
practice will lead justices to shift the way
they approach adjudication in all contexts,
involving vote trading or not. The more
justices start thinking about adjudication in
terms of optimal rulemaking, a mental
perspective facilitated by the constant
search for potential gains from trade, the
more they will become emboldened to
make less case-tethered and contextdisciplined decisions generally
This feared transformation is certainly
not fanciful; indeed, some might think
justices are already prone to the disease of
imagining themselves as unconstrained
lawmakers and thinking about litigants as
inconvenient obstacles. But neither is the
transformation inevitable. Surely one can
imagine that, even as justices selfconsciously engage in vote trading, they
also remind themselves of the importance
of self-disciplined focus on case contexts,
facts, and parties. The question becomes
whether, as a prophylactic measure, a norm
against vote trading should be articulated
and internalized to forestall the risk of a
concomitant shift in the justices selfunderstood job description. In my view, the
prophylactic seems unnecessary, but I
recognize this is a subjective and
speculative judgment.

Conclusion
As Justice Brennan has noted, 'The
Court is something of a paradox - it is at
once the whole and its constituent parts.
The very words 'the Court' mean
simultaneously the entity and its members."
Appreciation of this paradox is reflected in
an exciting explosion of political science
scholarship modeling judicial behavior,
scholarship that both predicts and tests for
various forms of strategic or sophisticated
conduct, and also offers new
conceptualizations of the relationship
between individual judges and their
multimember courts. In particular, there is
growing recognition that judicial behavior is
not shaped merely by ideological attitudes
and conceptions of legal reasoning, but also
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by formal institutional structures and
informal role commitments. The question is
not whether judges act in strategic or
sophisticated ways, meaning whether they
consider the consequences of their choices
in light of the potential behavior of others.
The question, rather, is what institutional
commitments and conceptions shape and
constrain judges' preferences and goals as
they interact with colleagues to construct
decisions of the Court.
In particular, as noted in Supreme Court
Decision-Making (Howard Gillman and
Cornell W Clayton, eds., 1999),
"[B]argaining among the justices is not
merely a function of preferences plus an
awareness of interactive effects; it is also an
activity that is constituted by an evolving
set of normative institutional perspectives.
Because of these sorts of institutional effects
the justices internalize an understanding of
whether such behavior is to be considered
professional, as well as an understanding of
what forms of bargaining are acceptable .... "
One apparent "rule of the game" of
collegial judging is that, while certain forms
of output-focused strategic behavior are
accepted (even encouraged) and others are
quietly tolerated, explicit vote trading is
disallowed. In theory, this observable but
unwritten code of conduct might reflect a
widespread judgment that, in the long
term, vote trading is a counterproductive
strategy for goal-oriented judges on collegial
courts. My strong sense, however, is that
judges (and scholars) believe vote trading is
wrong, not just unwise. But why?
My conclusion here is that the answer is
more complicated than initial intuitions
might suggest. While vote trading and other
strategic maneuvers can plausibly be viewed
as furthering legitimate judicial objectives,
I have sketched a number of objections
suggesting that vote trading nevertheless
constitutes improper judicial behavior. But
different objections rest on very distinct
foundational assumptions about the nature
and purpose of collegial adjudication.
Moreover, some (though not all) objections
logically entail that certain accepted
strategic practices should be equally
disapproved as well. Finally, some
objections apply to vote trading or other
maneuvers only in some contexts but not
others, nuances not reflected in current
practice. My hope is that this inquiry will
stimulate deeper reflection about the
"paradox" of collegial adjudication, and
perhaps assist judges in developing a more
refined understanding of the norms of their
profession.
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